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Manylogicallyindependent but coordinatedfactorsconstrainthequest forvisual
primitives.First,phenomenologytellsusthatthevisualsceneiscomplex,butatthe
sametimethattherearerecurringelementsoutofwhichcomplexitymaybebuilt
(Kanizsa,1979). Second,mathematicalmodels showhowit is possibletobuild
complexrepresentationsoutofrepresentationsofsimplercomponents(Biederman,
1987).Third, computationalarchitecturemakesitplausiblethatthecomplexityof
retinal input (providing pixel size informationabout properties at places) be
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load of subsequentstages (Palmer &Rock, 1994). Finally, behavioral and
neurophysiologicalevidencefor specific, downtosingle-neuronsensitivity to
relativelywell delineatedfeaturesof theenvironment hasbeengatheredoverthe
lastdecades,startingfrom(Hubel &Wiesel, 1959).Butdothesecriteriaconverge
onasinglelist of primitives?Theydonot haveto, of course;andfindingout
that what weexpect tobephenomenologicallyor computationallyprimitive is
not sobehaviorallyorneurophysiologicallywill makeforaninterestingdiscovery.
This is inpart theinterest of (Chen, Zhang, &Srinivasan, 2003) findingthat
small brains suchas those of the honey beesdisplay a sensitivity toglobal
configurationalproperties,inparticulartopological propertiessuchasthepresence
ortheabsenceof holes in2-ddisplays. It looks as if not onlybees areableto
distinguishbetweenconfigurationsthat differonlyintheirtopological properties,
butalsotheyareabletogeneralizetotopologicallyequivalentconfigurationsthatare
rather different onmany other respects.Accordingto(Pomerantz, 2003), the
findings areinterestingfor tworeasons. Thefirst reasonis that thetopological
propertiesinquestionaregenerallyconsideredasrelativelycomplexandhardto
compute(Minsky&Papert, 1998)butatthesametimeareverydeepandrobust
properties of theenvironment—theyareinvariant under most transformations,
asopposed,say,tometricproperties, hencesensitivitytothemwouldhaveahigh











theO-shape(suchasa Â-shape,ora f -shape)andstimuli thataretopologically







topological properties.Thereis, of course,amuchgeneral problemof using2-d
stimuliinordertodrawinferencesaboutavisual systemthathasadaptedtoa3-d





thetopologyof 3-dbodies; thisbyitself wouldquestionsanyecological-adaptive
considerations.
Theglobalityof topologicalpropertiescanbecapturedintuitivelyinopposition
tothelocalityof other features.Thedirectionalityof aline, for instance,is an
intrinsicallylocalmatter.Atpointpthelinehasadirectionthatisgivenbyitstangent
atp. Littledoesitmatterhowthelinelookslikeata(sufficient)distancefromp.





popularsenseof ‘rubbersheet geometry’orbyreferencetoformal mathematical
notions. Theissueofcontrol inexperimental designreflectsthisuncertainty. Chen
etal.appropriatelypointoutthatitishardtotestfortopologicaldifferenceswithout
introducingsomenon-topological differencesinthestimuli: ‘‘thereseemtobe, in
principle,notwogeometricfeaturesthatdifferonlyintopologicalproperties’’(2003,
p. 6687). But fromtheviewpoint of mathematicaltopology, this is inaccurate.
Anopensphereandaclosedsphere—ortheir2-dequivalents,aclosedcircleandan
opencircle—havedifferent topological propertiesbut thesamemetricproperties
(sameradius,astheboundaryoftheclosedcirclehasnodimension). Tobesure,
thisfactmaynothaveanyconsequenceforthedesignofvisual teststimuli, asthe
difference between a closed and an open itemhas no visual counterpart
(dimensionlessitems,onemayargue, areunderperceptual discriminationthresh-
















if it weredemonstratedthat processingof thesefeaturesisavailabletothevisual
system,itwouldbepossibletoreassesstheclaimthattheglobalfeaturesinvokedby


















tenholes is expectednot be accessibletothe system.But surely these latter












featureof havingahole. After all, both(1) and(2) presupposethat theunity
(connection) of boththe boundaryandthe figure are accessed;andassessing
connectionisanotoriouslydifficultcomputational problem.However,ontheone
hand, thisisageneral problem, onethat affectsall theoriesthat aresupposedto
characterizetheentryunitsofthevisualsystem.Ontheotherhand,inordertoshow
that sensitivitytothefeatureof possessingaholeis not sensitivitytoavisual
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